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Introduction 
* Claudio Gonzalez-Vega 
Two of the main characteristics of the agricultural credit 
markets in the Latin American countries are' 
a. limited acc,;ss to formal credit, and 
b. a high degree of concentration of the loan portfolios 
of formal lenders. 
That is, only a small proportion of the total number of producers 
in the rural areas of these countries receive loans from formal 
lenders and, among ~hose with access to institutional loans, a 
very small group captures a very large share of the total amount 
of credit disbursed. 
In effect, it has been estimated that, on the average, 
only about 15 percent of the agricultural producers in the Latin 
American countries have had access to formal credit and tt1at, on 
~he average, about 20 percent of the total number of borrowers 
have received over 80 percent of the total amount ·::lf credit dis-
bursed (32, 73). This means that, about three percent of the 
total number of agricultural producers have been the beneficiaries 
of about 80 percent of the significant volumes of agricultural 
credit disb~rsed, during the last decades, by the formal lenders 
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of Costa Rica and at the AutonQmous University of Central America, 
bot~ in San Jose. This paper was written for the Second Inter-
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1981. The author wishes to acknowledge the support that his re-
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of the Latin American countries. Obviously, this has had a very 
significant impact on income distribution. 
Limited access to institutional credit and a high concen-
tration of loan portfolios characterize, not only agricultural 
credit programs but. in general. the evolution of the formal 
financial markets of these countries. Industrial credit and 
housing finance, among others, are similarly characterized. These 
features, however, seem to be particularly acute in the case of 
the agricultural sector. Although the arguments presented in this 
paper are, therefore, applicable to the financial system, as a 
whole, the illustrations included in it have been selected from 
rural credit programs in Latin America.· 
Circumstances asoociated both with the demand and the supply 
of credit explain this limited access and this high concentration 
of loan portfolios. Low average returns and high risks associated 
with agricultural activities induce a limited demand for agricul-
tural credit (21, 54). High transactions costs, for both borrowers 
and lenders, further contribute to reduce the size of these mark~ts 
and to restrict access to loans for many rural producers. 
The concentration of loan portfolios reflects, in particular, 
the underlying concentration of wealth and political power in the 
rural areas of the Latin American countries. If there are a few 
wealthy producers, who own a significant share of the total asse~s 
of the community, it is not surprising that they also receive a 
significant portion of the volumes of credit disbursed. However, 
there is increasing evidence that the distribution of formal credit 
portfolios is usually more concentrated than the distribution of 
land, the distribution of the value of the agricultural product, 
or the distribution of income in the rural areas of the Latin 
l~erican countries (8, 32, 57, 63, 70). 
In effect, the concentration of credit portfolios is not 
a mere reflection of the underlying concentration of wealth. On 
the one hand, wealth and access to credit are related in both 
directions. Previous wealth is an important determinant of access 
to formal credit, while access to credit is, in turn, one of the 
main determinants of the growth of wealth through time, particular-
ly in imperfect ar.d fragmented capital markets. Differential ac-
cess ~o credit, therefore, becomes not only a consequence, but 
also an important cause of the increasingly more concentrated 
distribution of wealth in the rural areas of Latin America. 
On the other hand, wealth differences are not the only 
determinant of the high concentration of loan portfolios. Both 
borrower and lender behavior, as well as the policies which 
influence this behavior and the regulations which constrain it, 
are among its determinants. This paper claims that, in particular, 
the interest rate policies adopted by most of the Latin American 
countries have significantly accentuated the restrictions on ac-
cess and the concentration of loan portfolios which arise from 
other circumstances. To demonstrate this propositior1, the paper 
looks at the probable impact of interest rate restrictions on 
the behavior of formal lenders and surveys several explanations 
of lender behavior in an attempt to find clues for an examination 
of the modus operandi of the rationing processes which explain 
these phenomena. 
Interest rates and income distribution 
Because interest rates, as relative prices, affect several 
types of decisions, they impact income distribution in various 
ways. As the relative price of the future in terms of the present, 
interest rates influence savings and investment flows. In this 
respect, interest rates affect the intertemporal distribution of 
income, between present and future generations. As the price of 
financial assets, interest rates affect the composition of wealth 
portfolios and, thus, the distribution of income among asset 
holders. As a component of the costs of borrowing, interes~ rates 
affect the distribution of income between those with access and 
those without access to credit. As a·price comparable to the 
rental price of capital, interest rates influence the choice of 
techniques and the selection of investment projects, according 
to factor intensities. In this respect, interest rates affect 
the functional distribution of income among factor owners (64). 
This paper explores the impact of the interest rates charged 
on the loans of formal lenders, on the personal distribution of 
income; i.e., on the distribution of income among borrower and 
non-borrower individual producers and runong borrower classes and 
among producer classes. For these purposes, agricultural producers 
may be classified into relevant classes, according to their size 
(large-small), wealth (rich-poor), the length of a banking 
relationship (old-new), the uncertainty associated with their 
productive activities (safe-risky), or according to any other 
criterion of socioeconomic, cultural or spacial location (urban-
rural, literate-illiterate, close-distant, private-public, 
political 'friend-foe, etc.) Any of these classifications will be 
relevant for the analysis to the extent to which it represents a 
classification related to credit rationing behavior or is closely 
correlated to such classifications. 
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Interest rate oolicies 
The interest rates charged on formal loans have been 
administrativ0ly set, or constrained by usury ceilings, in 
most of the Latin American countries. Even in the presence of 
high rates of inflation, these interest rates have been kept 
at low nominal levels. As a result, in real terms most of these 
rates have been negative, erratic and unpredictable. 
Interest rates not only have been kept at levels which 
are too low in many respects, but also a differentiated struc-
ture of interest rates has been enforced (31). Usually, this 
has been an inverted structure. That is, it has not reflected 
the differential costs and risks associated with different 
borrower classes (30). Rather, it has reflected the desires of 
policy makers to favor some sectors or activities at the expense 
of others. However, the borrower classes usually favored with 
the preferential rates (e.g., small farmers) have frequently 
been the classes with re·3pect to which formal lenders experience 
the highest expected risl:s and costs. As a result, formal 1 enders 
have been forced to charge the lowest rates precisely to those 
borrowers to which they would want to charge the highest interest 
rates. This paper claims that, as a result of these discrepancies, 
the borrower classes which the authorities have intended to favor 
have been actually harmed. 
Moreover, several Latin American countries, which have 
undertaken interest rate reforms, have encountered unsormountable 
political obstacles to extend these reforms to their agricultural 
credit programs. As a coneequence, while most other interest 
rates have been "liberatec!", or raised at significantly higher 
levels, the rates charged on agricultural loans and/or on small 
farmer loans have been ke,Jt at their originally low levels. 'rhis 
has significantly increased the differentials within the inverted 
structure described above, further augmenting the distortions, 
as well as accentuating their consequences on credit allocation 
and on the concentration of loan portfolios. 
For examule, in the mid 1970's, while the commercial interest 
rates and the Government bond rates reached 50 percent per annum 
and more in Brazil, the interest rates charged on agricultural 
loans. were kept at 15 and 17 percent per annum (6J). Substantial 
inefficiencies in credit allocation and inequities in income 
distribution resulted frJm this policy (1, 8, 57). 
The interest rate subsidy 
Two kinds of consequences on income distribution rosult 
when restrictions are imposed on the interest rates that formal 
lenders can charge on their loans: 
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a. a direct impact, due to the implicit subsidy, and 
b. an indirect impact, due to the differential influence 
of the res~rictions on access to credit. 
When the interest rates at which credit is disbursed do 
not reflect the social opportunity cost of the resources trans-
ferl·ed plus the social cost of transfering them, there is an 
implicit subsidy. This subsidy, per ~. can have a significant 
i.mp,lct on income distribution. 
Suppose, conservatively, that the social costs of the loan 
amount to 10 percent per annum in real terms. If the nominal 
rate of interest charged is 15 percent per annum, but the rate 
of inflation is 55 percent per annum, then the real rate of 
intt'rest charged is about 40 percent, and a rate of subsidy of 
50 percent is implicit in this credit transaction. That is, 50 
cents out of every dollar loaned represent an outright transfer 
of resources. If the total volume of credit disbursed represents 
60 percent of the gross value of the domestic agricultural out-
put, only in this sector, the total amount of the grant will be 
equivalent to 30 percent of the value of this output. This is 
a V~!ry sizable transfer of resources and its impact on income 
distribution is very significant. 
Because the subsidy implicit in under-priced credit can be 
so uubstantial, it is not surprising that policy makers have 
considered it a powerful instrument for income redistribution. 
However, for reasons which are explained in this paper, the 
subsidy seldom reaches its intended beneficiaries. The vested 
interests of outspoken powerful groups, which eventually capture 
the subsidy, in turn originate the political difficulties to 
extend financial reforms to agricultural credit programs encoun-
·cered everywhere. 
This paper claims that credit, in general, and interest 
rate subsidies, in particular, are actually a very poor tool for 
income redistribution. The mechanism is inefficient, because 
the same redistributive objectives could be achieved at much 
lower social costs by other means. But even as a second best 
solution, this subsidy is not justified, because it is ineffective1 
i.e.,·because it is intrinsically incapable of achieving desired 
redistribution goals, and because, for empirically relevant 
circumstances, it is usually perverse; i.e., because it leads to 
a r~.~distribution "in reverse", actually accentuating the con-
centration of income, instead of alleviating it. While the 
dirvct impact of the subsidy is regressive, its indirect impact 
furtuer restricts access and concentrates loan portfolios. 
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To become a beneficiary of the interest rate subsidy, 
a producer must meet a precondition. He must first become a 
borrower from a formal lender. Access to formal credit, however, 
is very restrictive. As a consequence, a large proportion of 
the total number of producers are eYcluded, ad portas, from 
benefiting from this subsidy. 
In addition, the amount of the grant is directly pro-
portional to the size of the loan received. That is, 
( 1) * G = [ r - r ] L(W) 
where Gs amount of the grant, 
La size of the loan, 
Ws borrower's wealth, 
* r ' social cpportunity cost of the resources, and 
rs interest rate charged. 
The larger the loan, the larger the grant. In addition, 
since there is a high correlation between previous wealth and 
size of loan received, the wealthier the borrower, the larger 
the grant. As a result, in the Latin American countries, large 
producers have had access to large loans and to the accompanying 
large grants. Medium-size producers have had access to small 
loans and to the associated small grants. Small producers have 
had no loans, no grants. 
* Moreover, when the rate of subs-idy [ r - r ] has increased. 
the large borrowers have had access to loans larger than before 
and the magnitude of their grants has increased more than pro-
portionately. At the same time, small borrowers have found that 
their access to formal credit has become more difficult and that 
many of them have been excluded altogether from institutional 
portfolios (28). The precise nature of this indirect impact of 
the subsidy on access and thus on distribution will be examined 
in the following sections. 
There is one more way in which subsidized credit has had 
an unfavorable impact on income distribution. The resources 
freely transferred have been collected through the exploitation 
of savers, who have not been paid the true value of their savingsA 
and through the inflation tax. The distribution of borrowers 
has been much more concentrated than the distribution of holders 
of claims on the financial system with fixed nominal returns. As 
a result, the majority have paid a tax to finance a subsidy 
enjoyed by a few priviledged borrowers. 
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The impact of interest rate ceilings 
The conventional analysis of the impact of interest rate 
ceilings posits a market for credit, characterized by an ag-
gregate demand for credit, inversely related to the loan rate 
of interest, and an aggregate supply of deposits, directly 
related to the denosit rate of interest. If a ceiling is 
imposed on the loan rate charged, this model predicts that 
there will be a corresponding decline in the deposit rate. Less 
resources will then be mobilized through the financial system, 
and the total volume of lending will decline. At the ceiling 
loan rate of interest, however, there will be an excess demand 
for credit and, it is claimed, some non-price rationing mechanism 
will be required to clear the market. That is, the demands of 
all or some of the notential borrowers will be totally or 
partially frustrated. 
It has bee1 increasingly recognized that, in the case of 
agricultural credit at least, these rationing processes have an 
unfavorable impact on most producers, and that their negative 
impact is even more pronounced in the case of small farmers. This 
result has been intuitively linked to the higher risks and costs 
associated with lending to these small borrowers. The conventional 
model, however, cannot explain how these rationing processes 
actually clear the market. This paper attempts to explore the 
modus operandi of such rationing processes. 
In particular, although the conventional analysis shows 
that depositors will clearly be worse off, as a consequence of 
the ceiling, it does not allow to determine if all borrowers, 
as a group, or if specific borrower classes, are better off. 
That is, the conventional model cannot explain how the new total 
amount of credit will be allocated among borrower classes. As 
a result, with this conventional model it is not possible to 
determine the behavior of the amounts of credit received by 
borrowers of different classes or to determine the extent to 
which the reduction in loan rates of interest compensates or 
not for a 1ecline in the amount of credit received, when this 
is the case. As a result, the conventional model sheds little 
light on the impact of the ceiling on the allocation of re-
sources and on the distribution of income. 
In general, the imposition of a ceiling on interest rates 
has both aggregate and distributive effects on the portfolio of 
formal lenders. These effects include: 
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a. A reduction in the size of the total portfolio of 
assets of the lender. The reduction in the deposit 
interest rate paid, associated with the ceiling on 
the loan rate, reduces the lender's ability to at-
tract savings deposits and to mobilize other resources 
The reduction in the lender's rate of profit, associated 
with the ceiling, reduces its ability to attract equity 
capital. Tr,ese reductions in the lender's resources, 
in turn, reduce its ability to borrow, given prevailing 
leverage rules. The total volume of resources 
mobilized, therefore, declines on these three counts. 
b. A reduction in the lender's loan portfolio, as 
different from other non-credit investments (e.g., 
Government bonds, real estate, etc.). The ceiling 
on the loan rate reduces the relative profitability 
of lending and, therefore, it reduces the proportion 
of the lender's total portfolio of assets devoted 
to loans. 
c. A change in the composition of the loan portfolio. 
The ceiling alters the relative profitability of loans 
to alternative borrower classes and, given the 
rationing processes adopted by the lender, it leads 
to changes in the relative shares of the loan port-
folio going to different borrower classes. These 
portfolio redistributions usually lead to a greater 
concentration of the amounts disbursed in favor of 
a smaller group of borrowers. 
Bationing processes 
Any loan has three aspects: 
a. its size, 
b. the interest rate charged, and 
c. the non-interest terms of the loan contract, including 
requirements concerning collateral, borrower's equity 
or compensating balances, the maintenance of a stable 
customer relationship, the length of the loan period, 
the opportunity in which the loan is granted, the 
amortization schedule, etc. ()8). 
Lenders adjust all three of these aspects of the loar1 to 
each particular borrower. Given the risks and the transaction 
and infor~ation costs associated with different borrower classes, 
presumably lenders adjust these three aspects of any loan ir 2.n 
optimum manner. 
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When a ceiling on interest rates becomes binding, the 
lender loses one degree of freedom. It cannot adjust the loan 
by increasing the interest rate charged above the ceiling level. 
As a consequence, this adjustment requires either a change in 
the non-interest terms of the loan contract, or a reduction in 
loan size. As a consequence, the borrower receives a less 
attractive combination of these three aspects; i.e., a less 
attractive product, while the lender's profits decline. Pareto 
optimality is lost. 
There are, therefore, three possible ways to clear a 
credit market: 
a. through interest rates, 
b. through changes in the non-interest terms of the loan 
contract, and 
c. through changes in loan size. 
The first two ways are both examples of rationing through price, 
as different from rationing through quantity. That is, the non-
interest terms of the loan contract may be considered as 
elements of the price vector of the loan, in addition to 
interest rates. The third way to clear the market, however, 
is undoubtedly an example of non-price rationing (9). 
Non-price rationing properly defined, therefore, is a 
situation where the borrower's demand for credit remains un-
fulfilled, even though he is willing to pay the ruling interest 
rate and is willing to cover all the other elements of the price 
vector of the loan. This is not the case when the lender res-
tricts the non-interest terms of the loan. Thus, when the 
borrower is rationed out of the market via increases in the 
non-interest price of the loan, it is him who decides that 
the price is too high. In the event of non-price rationing, 
on the other hand, the potential borrower is willing to pay 
the full price, but the lender is not willing to grant him a 
loan of the size demanded. The difference between these two 
types of r~tioning, therefore, is that in the case of non-
price rationing an unsatisfied excess demand for credit will 
prevail. 
"When a ceiling on loan rates of interest is imposed, both 
types of rationing will usually occur; i.e., rationing will 
take place both via changes in the non-interest terms of the 
loan and in loan size. Moreover, both types of rationing 
frequently lead to a greater concentration of credit portfolios 
and thus have an unfavorable impact on income distribution. 
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Non-price credit rationing: a survey 
The conventional model does not make it possible to 
answer questions concerning the impact of interest rate res-
trictions on income distribution. For this, it is necessary 
to undErstand better the behavior of lenders, particularly in 
the presence of s~ch restrictions. Several models of lender 
behavior have been constructed in recent yeRrs. Some of them 
have adapted the tneory of the firm to explain this behavior, 
given alternative objective functions and market structures (11, 
)8, 51). Others have been constructed on the basis of port-
folio theory (6, 39). Both approaches are useful for our analys1u 
Because uncer~ainty and risk are important, portfolio theory 
provides fruitful insights. Because transaction costs as well 
as product heterogeneity and product differentiation are 
important, the theory of the multiproduct firm is particularly 
appropriate. In addition, it is possible to capture uncertainty 
and risk within the theory of the firm, by incorporating an 
~ante premium for risk in the lender's cost functions. 
Three theoretical developments have produced important 
results applicable to this analysis: 
a. The adaptation to financial markets of the general 
theories about price controls and black markets. 
Fruitful theoretical developments and lots of 
empirical evidence have resulted, in particular, 
from the analysis of the impact of interest rate 
ceilings and uther usury regulations on the markets 
of consumer credit and personal loans from finance 
companies, as well as in the markets for housing 
finance, in the United States of America (5, 11, 19, 
3J,J4, 35, 36, 49, 51, 58, 59, 65, 67, 68). 
b. The analysis of the determinants of interest rates 
in the informal credit markets of the low income 
countries, pioneered by A. Bottomley, as well as 
further attempts to measure the level of the com-
ponents of transaction costs, risk, and monopoly 
profits in these markets (2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 
28, 52, 53. 54, 63, 69, 72). 
c. The theories about the practice of non-price credit 
rationing by lenders, particularly those associated 
with the controversy over the availability doctrine, 
initiated in the early 1950's. This approach, in 
particular, can provide important insights about 
the behavior of lenders in the presence of interest 
rate restriction::> as well as auout the modllS 
o;erandi of the rationing processes aduEted by tr1crn. 
( t 9 1 1 0 f 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 3 t 2 4 1 2 8 I J 0 I J 7 I 0 I 41 I jf 2 I 
4), 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 56, 61, 62). 
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According to the availability doctrine, reductions in 
the money supply can have a significantly restrictive impact 
on spending, even if they induce only small increases in 
interest rates or if the interest-elasticity of the demand for 
investment is very low, because spending is basically 
constrained by the availability of credit. Credit, in turn, is 
partly allocated by lenders through non-price rationing 
mechanisms. When the money supply is restricted, credit is 
rationed more strictly and the reduced availability of credit 
influences spending. 
In a statement to Congress in 1952, Paul Samuelson argued 
that non-price credit rationing is entirely inconsistent with 
profit-maximizing lender behavior (62). The theory of non-
price credit rationing was subsequently developed in order to 
show that this behavior is rational and consistent with profit 
maximization. Although most of the contributions attempt to 
explain the existence of non-price credit rationing in the 
absence of ceilings and other interest rate restrictions, 
obviously such theoretical developments, as well as the 
empirical evidence on lender behavior gathered, are very 
useful in explaining the rationing processes adopted when such 
restrictions are imposed. 
Risk and non-price rationing 
Donald Hodgman was the first one to seriously attempt 
a general explanation of non-price credit rationing, consistent 
with rational behavior and which does not rely upon oligopolistic 
market structures or interest rate ceilings (40). He concentrated 
his efforts in showing that, due to the existence of default 
risk, any borrower will reach a loan size beyond which he will 
not be able to obtain additional funds by promissing to pay 
a higher interest rate. 
That is, Hodgman showed that a lender's sup~ly of credit 
to an individual borrower becomes totally inelastl.c at some 
rate of interest. The main reason is that the borrower's final 
wealth, and thus his ability to repay the loan, is finite. Chase, 
Miller, Ryder, and Freimer and Gordon provided additional 
refinements and corrections of Hodgman's model, to further 
take into account collateral, bankrupcy costs, variable-size 
investments in addition to fixed-size investments, etc., all 
of which significantly helped to better understand the nature 
of default risk (20, 23, 56, 61). Avio, in turn, considered 
these questions within the framework of portfolio analysis { 6). 
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As Jaffee has pointed out, however, the existence of a 
loan sunply function which implies that a borrower cannot 
obtain more credit than some finite maximum, regardless of 
what interest ratt:~ he is willing to uay, is not a sufficient 
nroof of a ~revailing nractice of non-price credit rationing (44, 45). To demonstrate the existence of non-price credit 
rationing, as well as its consistency with rational behavior, 
one must show that an excess demand for credit persists at the 
interest rate charged under equilibrium conditions. This re-
quires a discussion both of supply and demand. 
Jaffee, therefore, explored whether it can be optimal 
for a lender to set the interest rate at a level where demand 
exceeds supply, and leave it there in spite of this excess 
demand. That is, strictly speaking, non-price credit rationing 
occurs when the lender is unwilling to extend the loan demanded 
by the borrower a1d supplies only a smaller amount, in order 
to maximize its profits. Jaffee set up a model of a lender which 
maximizes its exuected profits taking into account possible 
borrower default on the ~oan. The lender's expected income from 
each loan was formulated as an explicit function of the 
parameters of the borrower's demand function, the probability 
of default, and the rate of interest charged on the loan. Within 
this framework,the proof of the rationality of rationing amounted 
to showing that the lender can increase its expected profits by 
rationing at least some customers. 
With this model, Jaffee showed that credit rationing is 
not profitable for a lender acting as a discriminating monopolist, 
i.e., for a lender which maximizes its expected profits with 
respect to each borrower separately and is free to charge each 
borrower a different interest rate. However, if the lender is 
constrained to charge all borrowers the same rate although it 
can choose this rate freely, and can decide on thE size of the 
loan to be granted to each borrower, then at the common optimal 
interest rate, for some borrowers the most profitable loan for 
the lender to supply may be less than the amount demanded. The 
same result is obtained if the lender sets up a number of borrower 
classes and charges only borrowers within each class the same 
rate. 
Jaffee concentrated his efforts, therefore, in showing 
that,.due to the existence of default risk and of constraints 
on the differentials among the interest rates that lenders can 
charge to different borrowers, non-price credit rationi~g i~ . 
profitable. That is, if for some reason lenders engage ln llmlted 
interest rate differentiation among borrowers, in the sense that 
they charge identical rates to nonidentical borro~ers, at the 
common interest rate charged, the demand for credlt of some bor-
rowers will exc~ed the lender's optimum supply to them. 
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Jaffee considered that, aside from usury ceilings, the 
pressure of legal restrictions and considerations of good will 
and social mores would make it inadvisable if not impossible 
for a lender to charge widely different rates to different 
borrowers. Lenders would tend, instead, to limit the spread 
between the rates and to justify ~he remaining differentials 
in terms of a few objective and verifiable criteria such as 
industry class, asset size, and other standard financial 
measures. A classification scheme of this type is likely to 
be the result of tacit collusive agreements among oligopolistic 
lenders, too. The entire structure of interest rates, therefore, 
would tend to be comnressed within narrower limits than would 
otherwise be o~timal: The result is that widespread non-price 
rationing would occur. 
The constraints on interest rate differentiation, in 
addition, may be the result also of the costs, especially 
information coste, of distinguishing between different borrowers 
and their risk characteristics, what in the more recent 
literature are known as "screening costs", as well as of the 
direct costs of a more complicated and detailed interest rate 
structure (46). 
More recently, Keeton has distin~ished between two 
types of non-price credit rationing (50). In one case, such 
rationing is said to occur whenever a borrower receiv·es a 
smaller loan than he would desire at the ioterest rate charged 
by the lender. In the other case, the price of credit is defined 
as the complete set of loan terms confronting a class of 
borrowers with given characteristics and the demand for credit 
is defined as the total number of loans which members of the 
class would like to receive at those terms. In these cir-
cumstances, non-price rationing occurs whenever the total 
quantity of loans demanded by the class at those terms exceeds 
the total quantity supplied by the lenders. 
Keeton showed that these two types of rationing may be 
observed in equilibrium situations, even in the absence of 
government-imposed constraints on interest rate and under con-
ditions of perfect competition. It may occur in the first sense, 
if there is a risk of default which increases with the size of 
the loan. It may occur in the second sense, if there is a moral 
hazard problem resulting from the lender's inability to monitor 
all relevant characteristics of the borrower's investment 
project. 
When a borrower enjoys limited liability, he will have 
an incentive to increase the riskiness of his investment project. 
Because a fixed amount is due at the end of the period, the 
borrower receives all the gains from exceptionally high outcomes, 
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but because he enjoys limited liability, he suffers none of the 
losses from exceptionally low outcomes. As a result, the borrower 
will benefjt at the expense of the lender if he can alter the 
characteristlcs of his investment project in such a way as to 
increase the probability of both very low and very high out-
comes. In fact, the borrower may well prefer a project with 
greater risk to one with high~r expected outcomes. 
In some ca~:cs the lender may find it possible to specify 
all relevant cha1·acteristics of the borrower's investment project 
in the loan cont1·act and enforce such agreements by moni turing 
the borrower's bt·havior. However, if this cannot be done, the 
lender will want to take into account the effect that the terms 
of the loan have on the borrower's project choice. An incrt~ase 
in the interest rate on the loan may affect the borrower's project 
choice in the sai .. c way that an increase in insurance coverage 
will influence a policyholder's level of care in avoiding ac-
cident. Keeton showed that this moral hazard may perform essen-
tially the same role as interest rate ceilings in inducing non-
price credit ratlonin~. Xn addition, if there is some indivisibility 
which makes it imposs1ble to reduce the loan size, the second 
type of rationing will take place. 
The type of moral hazard examined by Keeton is in fact just an example of a broader class of imperfections which 
prevail in credit markets. When any one of these imperfections 
is present, an increase in the interest rate charged will have 
an adverse effect on the lender's expected returns, which in 
turn may outweight the favorable direct effect of the increase 
in this rate on the total amount due ( 7). One such imperfec-
tion arises from the fact that the lender may have to incur 
liquidation, collection and recovery costs if the outcome of the 
investment project financed is insufficient to re:ray the loan 
and the borrower is forced to default. As observea by Barre, 
an increase in the interest rate raises the probability of 
defaultand, therefore, it increases the expected value of these 
bankrupcy costs (10). 
Another type of market imperfection arises when the out-
come of the investment project depends both on some "state of 
nature" which is realized at a later date and on the amount of 
additional resources that the borrower is willing to contribute 
to the project after that state is realized but before tht> loan 
becomes due. Since the borrower receives only that part of the 
outcome which remains after repaying the loan, he will P.ith~r 
contribute the same amount of new resources as if he received 
1.5 
the entire outcome and repay the loan in full, or he will con-
tribute no new resources and default. Since the borrower will 
choose the latter course whenever the amount left over after 
paying back the loan would be less than the opportunity cost 
of the new resources, an increase in the interest rate will 
make it more likely that he will default. The analogy in this 
case is the insurance policyholder's incentive to order 
excessive repairs for damage if the accident occurs, because 
he pays only part of the cost. 
Finally, Fried and Howitt have attempted to extend to 
credit markets some recent developments in the theory of labor 
contracts, which explain the closely analogous question of 
why firms lay workers off rather than adjust wages. Their an-
swer is that credit rationing exists as part of an equilibrium 
risk-sharing arrangement between the lender and the borrowers. 
A borrower and lPnder can benefit not only from trading loan 
contracts now, but also from an "understanding" or "implicit 
contract" concerning the amounts they will be willing to trade, 
and at what prices, under various conditions in the future. By 
means of such arrangements lenders and borrowers can share the 
risks associated with an uncertain future. Thus their arrange-
ments may be similar to insurance contracts in which the less 
risk-averse party agrees for a fee to bear some of the risks 
to which the other party would otherwise be exposed (24). 
If loans were always negotiated in spa~ auction markets, 
borrowers would be exposed to the risk of fluctuating interest 
rates on their loans. A lender may be willing to insure the 
borrower against part of sue~ risks by a policy of keeping 
interest rates less variable than they would be on spot auction 
markets, in return for which the borrowers may be \~illing to 
compensate the lender in the form of a higher average interest 
rate. By dampening the movements in interest rates, these 
arrangements open up the possibility of non-price credit 
rationing. 
The relationshipsbetween borrowers and lenders are 
involved and highly personal. The object being traded is 
heterogeneous, since it involves the trustworthiness of the 
borrower, and on either side of the market there are nontrivial 
costs-involved in switching one's trading partner. Normal 
arrangements between borrowers and lenders take into account 
the advantages to both sides of maintaining a continuos relation-
ship. Fried and Howitt show that, if there were no costs of 
switching trading partners non-price credit rationing would not 
occur. Furthermore, this analysis explains the tendency of 
lenders to ration least heavily those customers with the 
longest standing relationship. 
16 
!lmodel of lender bAhavior 
The theories of non-price credit rationing surveyed above 
auggest types of lender behavior which can help to explain the 
rationiJ.g proc.::sses adopted by lenders in the presence of interest 
ratE:! restrictions. Interest rate ceilings and the enforcement of 
inverte 1l interest rate structures lead lenders to reduce loan 
sizes and to restrict the non-interest terms of loan contracts, 
according to the same classes of criteria predicted in these 
models. The nature of these criteria suggests that these 
rationing processes favor larger, safer and long-standing 
borrowers and harm sMaller, riskier and newer borrowers. This, 
in turn, worsens ir!come distribution. A very simple model of 
non-price credit rationing is developed here in order to 
illustrate how this differential impact of interest rate 
ceilings on access to credit can take place. 
Assume that a lender is a profit maximizing firm and that 
its only source of revenu.es are the interest payments on the 
loans received. There ar·~ three components of this lender's 
costs: 
a. the opportunity cost of the funds, 
b. the costs of administration of the loans, and 
c. the losses due to default. 
Assume that the opportunity cost of the funds is given, 
independently of loan size, and that.it is identical for all 
borrower classes. The costs uf administration include the 
handling costs of the loan, incurred in recording and disbursing 
it and in receiving payments. These handling costs tend to be 
independent of the size and degree of riskiness of the loan. 
1\s a function of loan size, therefore, they can be treated as 
a fixed cost. The costs of ad~inistration also include the 
risk-reducing costs of the loan, directed at reducing the 
probability of default in the portfolio, through the adquisition 
of information and its use in selection decisions, a::; well as 
through supervision and collection efforts. 
The risk-reducing costs ar.e not independent of loan size 
or of.the expected losses due to default. If more resources are 
spent in loan evaluation and supervision, the lender can r0duce 
it& losses due to default. The lender, however, cannot complet~)ly 
eliminate uncertainty about repayment. It must include among 
its iUf. ante costs, therefore, a premium for risk. The lendur's 
costs functions are the result of all of these components. 
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Loan contracts have many dimensions: length of the period, 
type of collateral, size and area of activity of the borrower, etc. 
As a consequence, loans must be treated as non-homogeneous 
products. In particular, loans to different classes of borrowers 
must be treated as different products if the lender distinguishes 
between them and if it estimates different cost functions for 
each borrower class. The lending costs curves for some borrower 
classes will be higher than for other borrower classes. For 
example, usually the cost curves of lending to smaller producers 
will be higher than the cost curves of lending to larger producers. 
On the other hand, however, Gonzalez-Vega has shown that, for 
each borrower class, the marginal costs-of lending increase as 
the size of the loan increases (28). 
Different degrees of riskiness are one of the main criteria 
to separate borrowers into different classes. Obviously, it is 
in the interest of the lender to distinguish among as many 
borrower classes as possible, but this requires information 
that is costly to acquire and to process or that may not be 
available. The lender, therefore, sets up a limited number of 
classes and estimates a cost function for each class. Within 
each class, costs can be expressed as a function of loan size. 
If he is not prohibited to do so, the lender will charge dif-
ferent interest rates, for a loan of the same size, to bor-
rowers of different classes, as well as different interest rates 
for loans of different sizes, within a given borrower class. 
For a given class of borrowers·, as a function of loan 






C = dL + H + xL 
C: total cost of the loan, 
L: loan size, 
da rate of opportunity cost of the funds (constant), 
Ha fixed handling costs of the loan, and 
xs optimum combination of risk-reducing average costs 
and a premium for risk, resulting from the lender's 
effort to minimize their sum, for a given borrower 
class (28). 
















a +oan to the i-th borrower, or class, 
charged to'the i-th borrower, or class, 
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L. • ~ize of loan to the i-th borrower, or class, l 
c1 s cost of a loan to the i-th borrower, or class, and 
w 1 the lender's total profits. 
For a perfectly discriminating monopolist, profit maximization 
would require that loan size, for each borrower, that equates the 
marginal revenue and marginal cost of the loan to the lender. As 
Jaffee has shown, if the lender is constrained to charge a 
uniform rate to different borrowers, even if it can freely 
choose it, profit maximization may require non-price credit 
rationing (44). A similar result will be obtained, a fortjori, 
if a binding ceiling on interest rates is enforced. 
Assume that a ceiling r* is imposed on the ratea of in-
terest charged on all kL1ds of loans. Given the possibility of 
non-price rationi·.g, the profit-maximizing loan sizes for 
different borrowers can .)e obtained as the sol..ltion of a 
~rogramrning problem, in which the demand functions are 
~ntroduced as inequality constraints (22). If there is no 
rationing, loan size will equal the amount of credit demanded 
at the interest rate charged. If there is rationing, the 
inequality constraint will be binding, and an excess demand 
for credit will prevail at the interest rate charged. 
The lender, therefore, is assumed to maximize: 
n n (4) ~ = r* ~ L1 - ~ c1 
subject to: 
L. - D. s 0 
~ ~ 
0 s L. 
~ 
where n1 s amount of credit demanded by the i-th borrower, and 
r*s interest rate ceiling, supposed binding. 
The corresponding Lagrangean function is: 
n n n 
(6) K = r* I: L.- I: C.- EA.. (L.- D.) 
l l ~ ~ ~ 
(7) 






- A. • .s 0 ~ 
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n ac. ~ {8) l: ( r* aL. A.. ) L. = 0 ~ ~ ~ 
{ 9) )... (L. - D. ) s 0 ~ ~ ~ 
(10) L. - D. s 0 l. l. 
(11) 0 s L. 
l. 
(12) 0 .s A.. 
l. 
When non-price credit rationing does not take place, the 
borrower receives the size of loan demanded. That is, Li = Di. 
From condition (9), this requires that A.i be strictly positive. 
From condition (8), in turn, this implies that the interest rate 
charged must be l.igher than the marginal cost of the loan. On 
the other hand, non-price credit rationing implies that 
Li - Di < 0. In turn, this requires that A.i = o. Thus, when 
non-price credit rationing is taking place, the marginal cost 
of the loan is being e~uated to the ceiling interest rate r*. 
Depending on the relatJ.ve level of the ceiling with respect to 
marginal cost curves of lending, none, some or all of the 
borrowers may be subjected to non-price credit rationing by 
a profit maximizing lender. 
On the iron law of interest rate restrictions 
Non-price credit rationing is widely practic(3d by formal 
lenders in the Latin American countries. Several mechanisms and 
rules of thumb are employed to restrict the size of the loans 
approved for certain borrower classes. Frequently, the size of 
these loans is well below the amounts demanded at the subsidized 
interest rates charged. 
Amon6 the most popular devices for non-~rice credit 
rationing is the establishment of limits ( 11aVJ.os") on the amount 
of credit to be granted per hectare of land to be cultivated. 
These limits vary from crop to crop, presumably reflecting the 
different costs of production associated with different crops. 
Frequently, however, the proportion of total costs covered by 
these limits varies significantly from crop to crop. These 
differences tend to reflect the lender's perceptions about 
the risks and costs associated with loans for different crops. 
As a result, the proportion of total costs to be financed is 
usually higher in the case of the safer and more profitable 
commercial crops, usually for export, than in other cases (32). 
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The establishment of limits of credit per hectare to be 
cultivated has also been very vulnerable to political pressures 
from interested groups, particularly in the case of public 
lenders (71). As a result, the es-timation of costs ha~> been 
more liberal in the case of powerful borrow0rs. Sine~ a subs-
tantial subsidy is implicit in under-priced credit, tr,0 higher 
the estimation of costs per hectare, the grflater the L1Jbsidy 
to be received. 
During inflationary periods, moreover, not all of these 
limits are corrected at the same pace. While the limit::; uf 
credit to some borrower classes are frequently and fully dd-
justed, this ls not the case for other borrower classes. A~ 
a consequence, some producers continue to receive the L8me, 
or even larger amounts of credit, in real terms, as the 
inflation procee~s. whiL~ other producers receive loans of 
a smaller size, in real terms, every time. The latter arc then 
forced to seek addition8l loans in informal credit markets, 
in order to complement t~e institutional loans received, or 
to reduce their level of activity. 
Given this behavior of lenders in Latin America, their 
loan portfolios usually inclu<le both "rationed" borrowers, in 
the sense described, and "non-rationed" borrowers. The latter 
are borrowers who receive all the credit that they demand at 
the interest rates charged. They are the equivalent of the 
"prime-rate" borrowers. The "rationed" borrowers, on the other 
hand, are granted loans that do not satisfy their demands for 
credit at the going interest rates. This situation is represented 
in Figure 1, for a two-borrower case. 
At a given interest rate ceiling, r*, the "rationed" 
borrower, represented in the right-hand quadrant of Figure 1, 
receives a loan of size L 1 , ~iliich equates the interest rate 
charged with the marginal cost of lending and which leaves 
him with an unsatisfied demand for credit. On the other hand, 
the "non-rationed" borrower, represented in the left-hand 
quadrant, receives a loan of size L 2 , as he demands. 
What Gonzalez-Vega has called the "iron law of interest 
rate.restrictions" predicts that, if for some reason the 
interest rate ceiling becomes more restrictive, the size of 
the loans granted to "non-rationed" borrowers will increase, 
and the size of the loans granted to "rationed" borrowers 











La M2 L2 0 M1 Ll 
In effect, as the ceiling is lowered from r* to r**, the 
size of the loan granted to the .,non-rationed" borrower increases 
from L2 to M2 , as he dem~~ds a larger loan at the lower interest 
rate. At the sam8 time, the size of the loan granted to the 
"rationed" borrower declines from L1 to M1, along the upward-
sloped marginal cost curve of lending to him. These changes in 
loan size imply a redistribution of the lender's portfolio in 
favor of t!ie 'hen-rationed" borrowers. 
Since the "non-rationed" borrowers tend to be the large, 
weal~hy, influential producers, who are already receiving the 
largest loans, this behavior of the lenders, in the presence of 
the interest rate restric~ions, further tends to concentrate the 
distribution of loans by size. Moreover, if the ceiling becomes 
too restrictive and it does not allow the lender to cover its 
variable average costs, it will lead to the complete exclusion 
of certain borrower classes from the lender's portfolio, further 
limitin~ the access of marginal producers to formal credit and 
further concentrating ~he lender's credit portfolio in favor of 
a few priviledged producers. 
L1 
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Transaction costs and other forms of rationing 
High trans3ction costs for both lenders and borrowers 
explain the limited access of agricultural produc(rs to formal 
credit. When ceilings nre imposed on interest rates, lenders 
may find themsel \ ·"'S ur1able to cover these co~ts. In addj tion, 
due to a reduction in their scale of operations, these costs 
may be higher at the new levels of lending ( 11). In e i Lher ca<Je. 
ler.ders will tend to practice both non-price crcd it rationing 
and a restriction of the non-interest tennf} t>f thf• Joan price. 
The latter, in turn, may shift some of the transact.uJn cost~; 
from the lender Lo the borrower's. This behavior dvi'S nut affc< t 
all borrower classes urnf8rmly. Rather, it tends to rr;:_, Lric L th.j 
access of marginal borrow.,rs to cr<.:dit mort) than propurtionatPly, 
further contributi ·1g to a greater concPntration of loan 
portfolios. 
To set up a certain number of borrower classes, which 
would allow the lenaer to deal more efficiently with dif-
ferential risks, jt must <,..l.cquire information about crt-"d1 t-
worthiness and use it in the determination of loan ulzoL>· More 
information usually allows the lender to make better .;e l ~·c tl on 
decisions and to ob l-ain 1. corresponding reduction in J u:.;st>s dut.• 
to default. IntE: rr.?st rate rE' strict ions, however, may constrain 
the lender's profitable 11se of information. For a lendE.'r wh1ch 
operates with narrow margins, for example, the evaluation uf 
mortgageable property may be the only risk-reducing activity 
which it can afford (28). When the allocation of loans 
becomes heavily influenced by the type of security offer~d, 
small producers with few ~ssets to pledge are penalized anJ 
loan portfolios become concentrated in favor of the wealthi~r 
producers. 
Moreover, the costs and returns to the lender from the 
use of information are a function of the degree of homogeneity 
among potential borrowers. Homogeneity allows the lender to 
set up a few borrower classes and reduces its transactJon 
costs. In the rural areas of the Latin American countrjes, 
however, there is much heterogeneity among producers. This 
would require that, in order to maximize profits, lenders 
establish a large number of borrower classes. Interest rate 
restrictions, however, restrict the number of borrower classes 
that the lender can set up. In addition, when th8 lender is 
unable to include a givE'n potential borrower in one of the 
establishe4 classes, it will not grant him a loan. If, due to 
the interest rate ceilings, a lender cannot afford the infor-
mation required to classify a borrower in a given class, it 
will exclude him ad portas from its portfolio. As a consc~quer1ce, 
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many potent1al borrowers which would have been otherwise 
supplied with loans, are thrown into a class of "non-bor-
rowers", and exclud ,_d altogether from access to formal cl;'edi t, 
High costs of borrowing, on the other hand, restrict 
many demands for credit. The total costs of transactions for 
the borrower tend to be independent of loan size; average 
transactions costs, therefore, are a diminishing function of 
loan size. For example, the transportation and lodging costs 
involved in a trip to a town with a bank branch, as well as 
the opportunity cost of the producer•s time spent in 
negotiating the loan, are independent of Joan siz~. These 
costs, however, may be too high in the case of a small loan. 
This restricts the demand for credit in the case of smaller 
producers proportionately more than in the case of larger 
producers. Moreover, it has been shown that, particularly in 
the case of small loans, transactions costs are several times 
higher than the interest rate payments charged ( 2). A 
producer, therefore, would be willing to incur in these 
transactions costs, only if he expects to receive a loan 
large enough. When a lender practices non-price credit 
rationing, reducing loan sizes, it discourages many potential 
borrowers from applying for loans. In fact, many lenders 
believe that, in these circumstances, there is not a demand 
for credit. The fact is that there is a potential demand, in 
excess, that would not be satisfied by the lender. The 
borrower simply does not bother to manifest it. The smaller 
and marginal producers are more acu~ely affected by these 
reductions in loan size, voluntarily excluding themselves 
from the lender's loan portfolio. 
When they are constrained by interest rate restrictions, 
the lenders will also tend to shift some transactions costs 
over to the borrowers. A profitable lender, for example, 
can afford to open many rural branches, thus absorbing the 
costs of getting borrowers and lender together. Because of 
economies of scale, these costs are lower in the case of the 
lender than as the summation of the costs of many borrowers for 
their trips to a distant branch. If a low interest rate 
ceiling is imposed, however, the rural branches will not be 
profitable. When the lender eliminates them, it shifts these 
transactions costs back to the borrowers. The latter may find 
that these costs are too high and may not demand formal credit 
any longer. The informal sources of credit would have acquired 
a comparative advantage over the institutional lender, despite 
the lower interest rate charged by the lattPr. The total cost 
of the loans from the informal lenders would be lower and the 
producers would prefer the~. 
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The lender'_§_ob.iective functicn 
The models of lender behavior discussed, in order to 
explairt ncn-prlce credit rationing and the concentration c f 
the portf~lios of formal lenders, have been based on the 
assumption of profit maximization. Different lenders, however, 
may have different objective functions. Some of them are small 
private banks maximizing profits, but others are large 
bureaucratic banks attempting to maximize market shares. Some 
are public banks attempting to maximize political influence 
and others are institutions attempting to maximize staff 
expenditures, managerial emoluments or discretionary profits, 
under different sets of constraints. In general, all of them 
are trying to maximize a utility function in terms of thtd r 
managers' set of prefert~ces, through the pursuit of either 
profit maximizin€:, or r10,1-profit maximizing strategies (66). 
The actual impact of in1erest rate restrictions on their 
beh~vior obviously deperds on the nature of their objectjve 
functions. 
For our purposes, however, formal lenders may be clas-
sified into two classes: 
a. those whose objective function includes financial 
viability and institutional survival a~ong the 
objectives pursued, and 
b. those whose objective function does not include 
financial viability. 
Among the second group of lenders we include one-shot pilot 
projects, credit programs interested in a small scale experiment, 
for a few years only, which are not interested in a pt;rman•·n t 
presence as a lender. We also include in this t:;roctp agPrwics 
set up to temporarily disburne emergency or pol i t:.cal e:;:cants, 
like a flood relief credit program. In the first eroup w~ 
include all lenders attempting to achieve all kinds of Goals, 
provided that they do it under the constraint that they must 
remain financially viable. 
To remain financially viable: 
a. the lender must be able to preserve and hopefully 
increase its loan portfolio in real terms; i.e., it 
must preserve the same purchasing power of ito 
loan portfolio; and 
b. its revenues must cover a sjgnificant portion, if 
not all of the lender's costs. 
A financially viable institution, therefore, Wlst tak~ intu 
account its revenues and costs; i.e., it must have a pro1'its 
strategy which guides the allocatjon of its portfolio 8J'11Jtl(~ 
borrower c 1 <:18::5 c s. 'l'he ntodel s de scr i bL d in this paper 8.1'•' 
a'IP1ic"•bl~ i.o thi~· cJass of institutions. 
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Some formal lenders may remain financially viable even 
if they do not possess a profits strategy, if they have 
continued acc8ss to funds from the Central Bank or from inter-
national agencies. However, 
a. Some measure of profitability is frequently included 
in the evaluations of the performance of these lenders. 
b. International agencies and fiscal sources may be 
willing to continue with their support only as long 
as the lender's l~sses are not too high. When these 
losses are substantial, even if the fiscal sources 
wanted to keep the financial viability of the formal 
lender, they may not possess sufficient resources to 
continue providing significant transfers to the lender. 
c. While inflationary financing from the Central Bank 
can mak0 large transfers in nominal terms possible, 
inflation erodes the real value of the lender's 
portfolio even more quickly. 
d. Formal lenders will be able to receive large fiscal 
transfers only to the extent that they accept 
a political guidance with respect to credit allocation. 
These lenders, therefore, lose their independence in 
decision making and become mere disbursing agencies 
for other institutions: they become huge cashiers for 
other government offices. 
e. When banking and economic criteria are replaced by 
political criteria for credit allocation, the 
rationing processes become more vulnerable to the 
influences of pressure groups and loan pcrtfolios 
become even more concentrated. 
f. The reluctance of politicians to take in~o account 
creditworthiness and their reluctance to enforce 
vigorous collection policies soon leads to high rates 
of default. Once many borrowers are not paying back, 
others will doubt that the institution will remain 
financially viable and will not pay back, either. 
Theirs becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and, 
unless huge fiscal transfers are forthcoming, the 
institution will not survive. At the end, the formal 
lender is merely a costly and arbitrary mechanism 
for income redistribution. When the resources kept 
by the defaulters are added up to the implicit sub-
sidies, huge amounts of resources would have been 
redistributed in favor of a few prnducers. 
26 
Conch.:.sion 
In Latin America, the interest rates that formal lenders 
can charge to agric:..~ltural producers have been constrained by 
ceilings that have kept them at low levels, usually below those 
of most other intcr;st rate::,. Frequently, these constr~1j nts 
have beer. jus-t,ifi~d as a politically feasit>LL: and admi..nl!;trativL'ly 
manageable mechanism to redistribute income in favor of ::.;mall 
producers. Despite these good intentions, however, th1·se interest 
rate restrictior1G have actually harmed the mnaJ 1 ar;ricu1 t1,ral 
producers. 
When credit i a under-priced, a substantial subsidy l :; 
transferred to all borroNers, in direct provortion to tht.~ .JiZ.f'~ 
of their 1 oans. A~; a result, this direct impact of the c.;e i 1 int,::> 
is regressive: lartSe bo::.·r:-owers receive large grants, L>ffid.l 1 
borrowers receive ::;mall t;rants. Non-borrowers, usually th1; 
smallest producers, receive no grants. The volume of thest 
grants can become very s1..:bstantial. 
The interest rate ceilings have also an indirect impact 
on distribution, through their differential impact on acct..!:J::J r.u 
credit. This differential impact is the CIHlS<.:quenct" r, f i..hl' 
lender's rationing behavior in the prcsenct of the excecs 
demands for credit generated by the interc s t .rate cei 1 inE~..:;. 
Since the conventional model of interest rate ceiling~; cannot 
explain the distributive consequences of the ceilings, thi~J 
paper has explored different models of non-price credit 
rationing and of rationing through the non-interest term~ of 
the loan contract. In eal:h ca.se it has been shown how lh( :.;e 
rationing processes restrict the access o~ the smaller prnducers 
to formal credit and concantrate credit purtfolius in fuVt)r:' of 
fewer larger borrowers. 
In particular, according to the iron law of interest 
rate restrictions, as the ceilings become more restrictiv8, 
the size of the loans granted to non-rationed larger prud~ccrs 
increases and the size of the loans granted to rat.ioncd .mallt:r 
producers declines. This redistributes portfolios in fnvGr of 
the larger borrowers. It can be claimed, therefore, that the 
interest rate ceilings enforced in most of the Latin Arnvrican 
countries are among the important detenninants of the 
limited access of agricultural producers to fonnal credit and 
of the high degree of concentration of the a~ricultural 
credit portfolios of formal lenders observed. 
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